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Abstract
This article traces the contours of an inconspicuous kind of state power in the form of sovereign safety. This 
power is articulated, more precisely, in a combination of four elements: the historical term of public credit, 
the liquid government bond, the risk-free asset of financial textbooks and the safe-haven function assumed 
by the bond market in times of uncertainty. All of these involve a peculiar translation from sovereign 
debt as the most risky asset to sovereign creditworthiness, circulating unsecured. If critical security studies 
has largely limited itself to a critique of the relatively recent sense of political state security, this article 
explores the relevance of a far older financial sense of ‘security’ and ‘securitization’ for contemporary 
studies of security. So far, the Foucault-inspired finance–security literature has emphasized the risk calculus 
as a principal mechanism in ‘securing circulation’. This article argues that sovereign safety constitutes an 
important overlooked factor in securing circulation in two ways: As the main form of collateral for financial 
transactions, its capacity to secure derives from being considered secure itself. As an epistemic variable, 
it constitutes the bedrock of modern finance theory. Moreover, rather than neatly complementary to the 
liberal security dispositif, sovereign safety can to some extent be said to represent the very object of the 
Foucaultian divesture of power.
Keywords
Collateral, Foucault, risk-free asset, securitization, security, sovereign credit
Introduction
The critical approach to and productive transformation of security studies since the 1990s has largely 
been articulated against a state-centric understanding of security. Security has been extended along 
different axes, defined as a performative speech act or reconceptualized in terms of a Foucauldian 
security dispositif. This article returns the focus to the state, but offers an alternative analysis of the 
central tenet of traditional security studies in terms of sovereign safety – that is, the state’s position 
as safe asset of the financial system. The perception of sovereign creditworthiness implied by this 
term rests on the peculiar shift of sovereign debt from being the most risky asset in medieval times, 
to circulating ‘unsecured’ – that is, trading merely on ‘full faith and credit’. This process of accredi-
tation can be understood as a securitization in the financial sense of the term as making liquid, mak-
ing credible and making plausible. This analysis thus draws attention to the relevance of the financial 
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sense of ‘security’ and ‘securitization’ for security studies, and provides a financial reading of the 
state that reveals a somewhat inconspicuous, but nonetheless vital, form of state power.
A growing literature has begun, partly in the pages of this journal, to examine the intricate affili-
ation of finance and security masked by the professional segregation of the two fields (Amoore, 
2011; Boy et al., 2011a; Cooper, 2004; De Goede, 2005, 2010, 2012; Dillon, 2008; Langley, 2013, 
2015; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011, 2012; Martin, 2007). De Goede’s (2010) comprehensive overview 
shows that, despite the relegation of the study of security and finance to the different disciplines of 
international relations, international political economy and modern finance theory, large parts of 
these disciplines nonetheless profess a finance–(in)security relation. The dollar diplomacy of the 
early 20th century, for example, represents an instrumental use of finance for the purposes of secu-
rity, while international political economy has traditionally pointed out the insecurity caused by 
financial speculation, contrary to the claims of modern finance theory. The conceptual interweaving 
implicit here is held to be explicitly captured by the security dispositif developed by Foucault in the 
Collège de France lectures of the late 1970s, and as such has informed the bulk of the critical 
finance–security literature (see Amicelle, 2011; Amoore, 2011; Boy et al., 2011b; Dillon, 2008; 
Langley, 2013, 2015; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011, 2012). Foucault defined the goal of the security dis-
positif that developed from the mid-18th century as that of ‘making possible, guaranteeing, and 
ensuring circulations’ (Foucault, 2007: 29) and the liberal security problematic as one of ‘sifting the 
good from the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement … but in such a way that the inher-
ent dangers of circulation are cancelled out’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). A critical technology for securing 
circulation has been identified in the ‘probabilistic comprehension, calculation and colonization of 
uncertain futures’ (De Goede, 2010: 106); and, since the 1990s in particular, the pricing and distribu-
tion of risks has been named as the driving factor of global financial circulation (Langley, 2013).
There is little doubt that the risk calculus and its development in financial models have played 
a pivotal role in both enabling and ‘securing’ the circulation of financial instruments. Yet this arti-
cle argues, first, that sovereign safety constitutes an important overlooked factor in securing circu-
lation: both as the most common form of collateral for financial transactions and as the epistemic 
variable that fundamentally underwrites the edifice of modern finance theory. Second, the article 
explores whether this analysis of the safe asset can be seen as complementary to the dispositif, or 
whether there is a certain dissonance given that the successful accreditation of the state may in fact 
be said to represent the very object of Foucaultian critique.
Before turning to a comprehensive outline of sovereign safety in its various facets, I will give a brief 
conceptual history of the notion of financial security and its two senses of means to secure a value/
contract and the value/contract itself, both of which remain central to the operation of financial mar-
kets today. Sovereign safety, which constitutes a curious overlap of these two senses of financial secu-
rity, is then described in four different manifestations: the historical term of public credit, the liquid 
government bond, the risk-free asset of financial textbooks and the safe haven role under market stress. 
The following two sections discuss the relation to the Foucaultian dispositif of securing circulation in 
more depth and propose an alternative analytic of power as translation from debt into credit. The last 
section draws some general conclusions for the relation between financial and political security.
Financial security: Means to secure and security itself
‘Security’, in the legal sense of collateral or pledge, or ‘securities’, as the common term for stocks 
and bonds in financial discourse, seem to bear no or only distant reference to political understand-
ings of security as protection or freedom from danger. Conceptual histories of security barely 
mention the financial-legal sense of ‘security’, if at all (see Conze, 1984; Rothschild, 1995; 
Wæver, 1997, 2004).1 Early contributions to critical security studies that do so refer to the 
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financial sense of security in an admittedly ‘descriptive’ manner, mainly to illustrate different 
intelligibilities of security. The main impetus here has been to undermine the ‘onto-theology’ of 
international relations’ axiomatic understanding of state security, not to enquire much further 
into the relevance of financial security for security studies (see Der Derian, 1995: 27–28).2 
While there exists a sizable body of legal literature on pledge, and collateral flows have been 
receiving increasing attention from political economy scholars, economists and anthropologists 
(see Gabor and Ban, 2015; Singh and Stella, 2012; Riles, 2011), these have not primarily consid-
ered collateral in terms of ‘security’.
The connotation of ‘security’ as pledge or collateral dates back to antiquity: in his Histories, 
Herodotus remarks that Egyptian creditors ‘required as a condition of loan that the debtor 
pledge the mummy of his father to secure the loan’, a pledge deemed of such ‘intense religious 
concern’ as to satisfy the debt (Squillante, 1982: 618). In archaic Greek law, the sense of 
‘pledge’ or ‘pawn’ corresponds with the term symbolon: at the time of barter, the consent of two 
contractors was not sufficient to establish a contract of exchange, which required a symbolon to 
serve as witness to the transaction (Shell, 1978: 34). A ‘symbolon’ (from Greek symbállein – to 
put together) was a token of recognition in the form of an object – such as a bone or picture – 
that was ‘divided specifically for the purpose of later comparison’ (Shell, 1978: 33). 
Alternatively, the parties exchanged small items such as rings or half coins as security for the 
agreement. Importantly, these did not function as money, but merely as ‘a necessary symbol of 
credit or trust’ for the actual transaction (Shell, 1978: 33). Similarly, for oral agreements in 
13th-century England, ‘a penny, or a larger amount, called a handsel, would be paid “in hand” 
or “in earnest”, to set a seal to a transaction’ (Muldrew, 1998: 106). Security as the means of 
securing an obligation was also signified by the Roman cautio and the Old French word mort-
gage. Curiously, all three terms – pledge, cautio and mortgage – carry an ambivalence of refer-
ring to the means of securing an obligation and to the obligation itself, or signifying ‘both the 
instrument and object which it was the purpose of the instrument to secure’ (Long, [1875] 2006: 
259–260). With the rise of monetary transactions and written contracts – ‘neither of which’, as 
Shell (1978: 33) points out, ‘require witnesses’ – all symbola became down payments or depos-
its specified in monetary terms and as such ‘invisible’. Yet, even when expressed in the same 
medium as the transaction, and despite the ambivalent usage, the pledge retained its legal dif-
ference and conceptual autonomy.
A pledge or collateral initially derived its value – and hence its capacity to secure – from the 
quality of being manifest as opposed to mobile (see P. M. Schuhl, cited in Shell, 1978: 32), a com-
mon example being fixed property such as land. Even if ‘chattel’ explicitly referred to movable 
collateral other than real estate, it was at first exchanged for safekeeping and entailed a personal, 
and not alienable, relationship.3 A first mobilization of collateral occurred with London goldsmith 
banking in the mid-17th century, where receipts issued by goldsmiths for gold deposited with them 
began to be traded on the credit of individual goldsmith bankers. According to Powell’s (1916) The 
Evolution of the Money Market (1385–1915), this precursor both to the banknote and to the gov-
ernment bond required a critical change of the legal relationship between goldsmith and customer: 
the goldsmith turned from ‘bailee [and trustee], precluded from using the bailed chattel for his own 
personal advantage, without the consent of the bailor, express or implied, unless such use be need-
ful for its preservation (as in the giving of exercise to a bailed horse)’ (Powell, 1916: 63–64) to 
‘debtor’, able to use the money lent to him. Today, the high mobility of collateral is complicated by 
its reuse: As Riles (2011: 43) notes,
if, as is permitted under the law of some countries, the pledgee (the party that receives collateral) ‘repledges’ 
the collateral to yet another party to satisfy its own obligations, which then repledges it again, then lawyers 
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are left to make sense of a constant global movement of collateral in and out of accounts in many 
jurisdictions in terms of legal rules created to address a far more stationary and localized conception of 
property and contract rights.
Even if mobile, however, collateral remains conceptually different from the promise to pay as a 
‘separate’ and ‘additional’ obligation (William Colebrooke, cited in Riles, 2011: 2), or of accessory 
and auxiliary nature (Slovenko, 1958: 63). In medical discourse, ‘collateral circulation’ refers to 
‘circulation carried on through lateral or secondary channels after stoppage or obstruction in the 
main vessels’,4 and thus stands for latent, but potent, counterfactual circulation. Analogously, the 
value of collateral consists in its unactualized, yet guaranteed, capacity to secure either contractual 
performance or the solvency of the issuer in the case of non-performance.5
From the end of the 17th century, the English term ‘security’ itself has evolved from the 
sense of pledge to also denoting the obligation itself: both ‘a document held by a creditor as 
guarantee of his right to payment’ and a common term for bonds and shares (‘securities’).6 
Whether or not ‘securities’ should refer to equity has been an issue of content, since ‘equity’ 
implies a contingent return. The 1970 Penguin Dictionary of Commerce thus condemns the 
indiscriminate ‘misuse’ of the term for shares and, apart from a ‘safeguard for a loan’, reserves 
it for negotiable instruments and certificates of liability whose repayment is guaranteed.7 
However, shares played a crucial part in rendering sovereign bonds liquid, as will be elaborated 
in the following text, and ‘security’ acquiring the meaning of financial commodity in the 17th 
century is closely bound up with the securitization – that is, the institutionalization and accredi-
tation – of sovereign debt.
Public credit
The development described amounts to the gradual establishment of sovereign creditworthi-
ness: the shift from sovereign debt being charged a far higher interest rate than commercial 
loans in the Middle Ages to its circulating ‘unsecured’ – that is, no longer requiring additional 
security in the form of either collateral or a high interest rate, but trading merely on ‘full faith 
and credit’.8 ‘Public credit’ is the historical term under which a permanent institutionalized 
government debt was debated in Britain, and other Anglophone countries, from the end of the 
17th century until the early 20th century.9 Bonds, long-term debt and secondary markets in 
government debt were already used by the Italian city-states to fund wars, and thus some date 
the invention of public debt back to the late Middle Ages (see Ferguson, 2009). Because of the 
coercive nature of these loans and the uncertain return of principal and interest, others, how-
ever, argue that public credit as a primary and voluntary market in government bonds only 
developed in post-revolutionary Britain with the ‘credible commitment’ of the sovereign (North 
and Weingast, 1989: 824). The constitutional amendments that instituted Parliament as guaran-
tor turned the royal debt into a national debt and sparked a new model of sovereign credit for 
(certain) states that, as the New York Times noted in 1865, marked a decisive break from the 
‘financial and commercial distractions which prevailed when States openly violated their sol-
emn contracts, laughed at their obligations, and appeared insensible of the disgrace of disre-
garding their plighted honour’.
Rather than a sudden discovery of virtue, the ‘mastery of Lady Credit’ was the result of mani-
fold factors: from the contested ‘invention of financial man’ through the disciplining techniques of 
double-entry bookkeeping (De Goede, 2005) and the consolidating political competition between 
the emerging parties of Whigs and Tories (Carruthers, 1996) to the moral validation of the insur-
ance trade (Lobo-Guerrero, 2012).10 It was also fostered by the reform of tax collection and 
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administration (Brewer, 1990), the pre-existence of a stable monetary space in Britain (Ingham, 
2004) and the dramatic increase of the credibility of the contract during the 18th century (Muldrew, 
1998). Notably, during the 17th and 18th centuries, public credit was coterminous with the emerg-
ing financial market itself and implied the ‘publick Faith’ in all the new virtual monetary instru-
ments of the ‘financial revolution’ (Dickson, 1967).
Although the ‘security’ of public securities was initially highly contested – with critics ranging 
from the Augustan satirists to Romantic poets and pamphleteers such as Blake, Shelley and Cobbett 
– a remarkable shift occurred from the mid-19th century onwards. Critical counter-discourses 
began to portray the destructive effects of finance in terms of the insolvency of private individuals 
and country banks, while the national debt strangely eluded this criticism (Brantlinger, 1996). 
Later modern and postmodern criticism similarly did not target public credit, but rather the com-
modity fetishism and consumer society associated with the Second Industrial Revolution.11 The 
national debt of the so-called advanced economies came to be considered as inherently legitimate 
and safe; and if debt remained a sign of moral weakness and inertia among less developed coun-
tries, it became ‘a credential of adroit risk management among the financially mature…. The abil-
ity to sustain debt, and the willingness to continue lending, were portrayed as signs of strength’ 
(Martin, 2007: 28).
This perception of sovereign safety was not harmed by the variety of default experiences of 
nearly all ‘advanced economies’ in the 20th century (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). It informed, until 
recently at least, an understanding of creditworthiness that was paradoxically only enhanced by the 
size and liquidity of the bond market, that is, the amount of outstanding debt. It is thus that the 
investment company Blackrock (2011), in a recent reassessment of sovereign bonds, has been able 
to identify four ‘traditional’ attributes of sovereign debt: (1) an apparently riskless rate of return 
upon which all other assets trade at a risk premium; (2) a very high degree of liquidity, whereby 
government debt assumed high-powered money characteristics; (3) its function as a reference point 
for the valuation of virtually all other asset categories; and (4) its role as a safe haven asset during 
times of market stress. The next sections will consider the different aspects of liquidity, risk-free 
asset and safe haven status of sovereign debt in more detail.
Liquid government bond
The term ‘liquidity’ has only been in use as a metaphor for the condition of financial markets since 
the end of the 19th century,12 but the association of monetary circulation with fluid dates back to 
the Hobbesian imagination of circulating money as the blood of the body politic (De Goede, 2005: 
23). Liquidity can be seen as a direct expression of the credit commanded by a financial instru-
ment, marked by a similar price for buying and selling. As Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) 
elaborate, British government debt was ‘liquidified’ through indirect capitalization via the three 
main joint-stock companies of the Bank of England, the South Sea Company and the East India 
Company. These companies issued shares on the stock market and loaned funds to the government, 
so that buying a share represented an indirect investment into the national debt (Carruthers and 
Stinchcombe, 1999: 373). Of the three, two were explicitly created to fund the public debt – the 
Bank of England in 1694 and the South Sea Company in 1711 – while the East India Company, 
incorporated in 1600, started to loan funds to the government in 1709. The London stock market 
had been highly ‘illiquid’ during the 17th century due to high transaction costs and the cumber-
some procedures for transferal of title. By 1710, however, it had turned ‘very active, highly cen-
tralised, and extremely liquid’, while direct forms of government lending, such as annuities and 
lotteries, remained illiquid (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999: 370, 373).13 Regardless of the huge 
losses of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, the number of national creditors continued to rise, and 
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despite his general condemnation of the public debt, David Hume acknowledged in 1752 that ‘pub-
lic securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the current price as gold 
or silver – no merchant now thinks it necessary to keep by him any considerable cash’ (cited in 
Brantlinger, 1996: 92).14
A critical element in the liquidification of the London stock market and the consequent consoli-
dation of the national debt were legal changes: the Promissory Notes Act of 1704 and the absorp-
tion of the law merchant into common law transformed financial claims into standardized, alienable 
and negotiable commodities – that is, able to be transferred to new ownership. The intermediary of 
the joint-stock company also worked to turn illiquid government debt into homogenous shares by 
reconciling different maturity periods of loans (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999: 374). The 
alienability of shares and bonds reflects the transition of banknotes from a ‘deictic promise with its 
embodiment in dates, individual names, and apparatus of witness’ to a de-deictified, depersonal-
ized and anonymous claim ‘payable to the bearer’, substituting a variable ‘meta-subject’ for the 
personal relationship (Rotman, 1987: 48).
The phenomenon of liquid debt consists in a peculiar merging of the present and the future: it 
both expresses actual circulation and reflects the perceived potential to circulate. If debt as a ‘con-
ditionality spanning the future’ (Lepinay, 2007: 95) entails uncertainty, the price of which is paid 
in the form of interest, liquid debt has come to be imbued with the certainty (and unprofitability) 
of the present. As Keynes ([1936] 2008: 108) held, interest is not a reward for saving but for parting 
with liquidity. It is illuminating to contrast the phenomenon of a liquid bond with Bauman’s (2000, 
2002) conception of liquidity. For Bauman, the predictability of the fixed institutions of classic 
modernity has been superseded by the uncertainty of ‘liquid modernity’. In the ‘fluid world of 
globalisation, deregulation and individualisation’ (Bauman, 2002: 19), primarily driven by unbri-
dled financial markets, nothing keeps its shape and social relations undergo constant change. In 
this state, ‘bonds’ as constraining and uniting forces of mutuality secured by the law and ‘bonding’ 
as ‘a term that signifies the stability of solids’ (Bauman, 2000: 2) have become cumbersome, inef-
fective and possibly ‘harmful’ arrangements. Their costly maintenance is eschewed in favour of 
novel ‘liquid’ techniques of power that neither ‘fix space nor bind time’ (Bauman, 2000: 2).
Bauman’s conception almost stands in direct opposition to the financial meaning of liquidity, 
which ‘dries up’ when confronted with irredeemable uncertainty and the flows of which depend on 
plausible narratives and trust. As Lepinay (2007: 99) notes, liquidity is ‘an index of a common 
world’, while periods of high volatility are described as ‘moments of high uncertainty about the 
definition of individuals and goods, moments in which stable ontologies crumble’. It is not the 
(im)materiality of a product but the uncertainty of its definition that has adverse effects on liquid-
ity. Rather than the ‘paramount source of uncertainty’ (Bauman, 2000: 121), liquidity follows from 
the accommodation of contingency into calculable risk: the successive innovations of modern 
finance theory to price financial instruments as well as credit ratings and structured finance deci-
sively contributed to an era of ‘liquid finance’. Yet what distinguishes the liquid government secu-
rity from other ‘bull markets’ is that it remains liquid, and even thrives, when all else fails, as I will 
discuss further in the section on the safe haven status later. Simply equating liquidity with capital 
mobility therefore overlooks a paramount difference between markets and between different 
market attitudes towards the future.
Risk-free asset
As De Goede (2005) has shown, early debates on public credit formed a critical first moment in the 
rationalization of finance and economics as scientific truth-telling domains. In the 20th century, 
sovereign creditworthiness assumed an explicit function within modern finance theory with Tobin’s 
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introduction in 1958 of the notion of the ‘risk-free asset’ to modern portfolio theory. Markowitz 
had laid down the foundations of modern portfolio theory in 1952 by developing a systematic 
approach to investment that distinguished between the riskiness of an individual security and the 
riskiness of a portfolio. An efficient portfolio – that is, one that offered the highest return for any 
given level of risk or the lowest risk for any given level of return – was achieved by the optimal 
correlation between different assets. Markowitz had mapped out the optimal combination of two 
risky assets as the ‘efficiency frontier’. Tobin extended Markowitz’s analysis by introducing a risk-
less asset, based on the assumption of a certain return of a government bond, at which investors 
could either borrow or lend. The effect of including the riskless asset produced the ‘striking result 
that the efficient set become[s] a linear line known as the capital market line’ (Pilbeam, [1998] 
2005: 178). The capital market line (line R*L1 in Figure 1) dominated positions on the efficiency 
frontier and optimized the risk:return ratio for both risk-averse and risk-embracing investors– 
people investing a share of their portfolio in bonds (lending to the government) could hereby lower 
their overall portfolio risk, while investors borrowing at the risk-free rate could achieve an excess 
market return according to the model (see Figure 1: both the risk-averse investor A and the risk-
embracing investor B achieve a better risk–return trade-off when lending/borrowing at the risk-free 
rate, corresponding to the points A* and B* on the capital market line). The introduction of a risk-
free asset had significant consequences for the long-contested practice of speculation: where spec-
ulation had during the 19th century been rationalized as professional risk-bearing, offsetting the 
majority of hedgers, the risk-free asset provided a rationale for leveraged speculation, that is, 
increasing speculative capital through taking on debt.
Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1981 ‘for his analysis of financial markets 
and their relations to expenditure decisions, employment, production and prices’,15 partly on the 
basis of his seminal 1958 paper. Yet the concept of the risk-free asset by no means constitutes the 
central focus or innovation, but rather takes the place of a helpful instrumentalization and ‘given’ 
Figure 1. The capital market line and the market portfolio (Pilbeam, [1998] 2005: 194).
Boy 537
means to improve the risk–return efficiency of portfolio investment. The risk-free rate continues its 
elemental but ‘backstage’ function in the 1973 Black–Scholes option pricing formula: a ‘seismic 
event in financial economics’ (Taylor, 2004: 250) that set off the tremendous post-Bretton Woods 
growth in derivatives trading.16 The impact of the formula consisted in a novel methodology that, 
in order to value a derivative, identified a ‘replicating portfolio’ or perfect hedge and then ‘invoke[d] 
the fact that a position that consists of a perfectly hedged derivative is riskless and thus can earn 
only the riskless rate of interest’ (MacKenzie, 2007: 59). This equation of positions was possible 
owing to the ‘no arbitrage’ stipulation of the efficient-market hypothesis where any price differ-
ence would be eliminated by market participants. The riskless position of the hedge – achieved by 
neutralizing a ‘long position’ in the underlying asset with a ‘short position’ in options – differs from 
the risk-free rate because it is based on the negative correlation of market risk, while the risk-free 
asset is by definition uncorrelated with any other asset. That is, the entire edifice of option theory 
hinges on the equivalence of two fundamentally different derivations of safety: the offsetting of a 
potential negative market movement with the opposite position – the perfect hedge – and the 
assumption of the safe asset based on public credit.
Modern finance theory and its remarkable practical influence thus rest as much on the probabil-
istic quantification of uncertainty as on the stipulation of a risk-free asset, and the latter is not only 
a critical element in the pricing of stocks and derivatives, but serves as a benchmark for valuing 
any financial asset: its inconspicuous existence, subsumed by the general focus of modern finance 
theory on asset pricing and the calculability of the future, has only begun to attract attention through 
the sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis. In what might be called the first 
systemic debt crisis of ‘advanced economies’, the riskless asset has been discovered as the ‘bed-
rock of finance and investment theory’ (Peebles, 2012), one of the ‘cornerstones of the global 
financial system’ (Viñals, 2011) and, historically, the ‘rock around which a financial system is 
built’ (Economist, 2012a).
Safe haven
Under conditions of ‘market stress’ and uncertainty, investors leave risky assets in a ‘flight to 
safety’ to the bond market. This condition can be read from the inverse bond price–yield relation-
ship: increased demand for bonds raises the price and thus lowers the yield, and vice versa. ‘Classic’ 
safe havens are the euro in Germany and the Swiss franc, but the US treasury market constitutes 
the largest and most liquid bond market globally. This is due to the dollar’s role as reserve currency, 
which obliges the USA to issue debt securities in which foreigners can invest those dollars 
(Economist, 2012b). Safe-haven yields below 3% (on a ten-year bond) are considered a sign of 
general market fear and doubt. However, the more confidently investors assess future prospects, 
the more the demand for government bonds will fall, lowering the price and raising the yield. Yet 
raised bond yields of safe havens can be claimed to signify two opposite conditions: either the 
imposition of a risk premium due to an increase in the perception of sovereign risk, or prospects of 
economic growth and an ‘ebbing of the panic’ that motivates investors to leave unprofitable safety. 
Borrowing costs for the government may therefore rise owing to a better outlook for the economy, 
while the greater a crisis, the cheaper it is for safe haven countries to borrow. At the same time, the 
fates of the ‘state’ and the ‘economy’ remain intertwined: the more bonds a government sells, the 
more their value increases, hurting the competitiveness of its exports.
The perception of sovereign safety indicated by such metaphors as ‘flight to safety’ and ‘bond 
shelter’ (Economist, 2012b) plays a systemic role of securing value that is somewhat different from 
the regulatory acts of securing financial stability via the stipulation of adequate reserves and col-
lateral at financial institutions.17 If these regulations have often been circumvented by financial 
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innovation – the credit default swap, for example, was motivated by the outsourcing of credit risk 
in order to reduce the amount of capital reserves that were required – safe havens offer a more 
voluntary and unregulated refuge for capital. Yet the regulatory requirement of sovereign debt as 
collateral also leads to the phenomenon of ‘captive buyers’ at the same time as the perception of 
safety has become scarce. In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, there are ‘fewer havens to 
choose from’ (Economist, 2012b),18 leading to such paradoxical effects as the yields of bonds 
issued by the USA, Germany and other states going repeatedly negative in 2012 and 2013. This 
phenomenon reverses the logic of debt into its antithesis, where creditors pay debtors in order to 
lend to them. The partly orchestrated demand for safe-haven bonds through ‘captive buyers’ as 
well as central bank policies of quantitative easing (purchasing bonds to lower interest rates and 
promote lending) have led to fears of a ‘bond bubble’, implying that rates are ‘artificially’ or ‘inap-
propriately’ low. Bond markets – traditionally ‘boring’ – are now said to constitute a major risk to 
financial stability in themselves.19 The bond market does not clearly fit the definition of a ‘bubble’ 
– as Shiller noted, ‘it doesn’t seem to be enthusiastic. It doesn’t seem to be built on expectations of 
rapid increases in bond prices.’20 Yet the worry is that ‘there is nowhere left for this bubble to go, 
given that it is now in the hands of the lenders of last resort’ (Deutsche Bank, 2014: 6).
Dispositif and the power of sovereign safety
Now that the contours of the different facets of sovereign safety have been outlined as public 
credit, the liquid bond, the risk-free asset and the safe haven, as what kind of power should this 
configuration be understood? Can sovereign safety as collateral and epistemic variable be neatly 
added to a Foucauldian liberal dispositif of securing uncertain circulation? What kind of state does 
it return to security studies?
Foucault’s lectures were held at a time when ‘financialization [was] just beginning to generate 
the primacy of circulating flows and dispersed, deindividuated, nonsovereign forms of commodity 
exchange associated with the rise of derivatives’ (Martin, 2007: 135). Nonetheless, his analytics of 
power has been regarded as a prescient grasp of the significance of preponderant finance. Although 
recent analyses (see Martin, 2007; Langley, 2015; Konings, 2014) deliver the lacking financial and 
monetary dimension of the security dispositif in a potent and illuminating manner, the present arti-
cle nonetheless explores a potential discrepancy between sovereign safety and the analytics of 
power of the dispositif. This discrepancy is rooted in the opposite orientations of what might be 
called the Foucauldian divesture of the centralized power of the state and the arguably very suc-
cessful investiture that sovereign credit represents. To fully develop this argument will be beyond 
the limited space available here, but the following reflections will do so in exploratory form.
Foucault (2004: 45) defines his project as a challenge to the three assumptions of sovereignty: sub-
ject, unity and law. Power is to be studied ‘outside the model of the Leviathan, outside the field deline-
ated by juridical sovereignty and the institution of the State’ (Foucault, 2004: 34), and the focus on the 
material processes of subjugation in their most regional forms and institutions in which power is ‘actu-
ally exercised’ (Foucault, 2004: 37). The historical survey and analytical decomposition of power 
mechanisms are intended to perform a divesture of the state: to undermine our ‘attachment to the birth 
of the state, its history, advance, power and abuses’, to attest to the ‘absence of a power centre’, and to 
‘attack the strong and the dense with the feeble, diffuse and lacunary’ (Foucault, 2007: 116).
This ‘anti-leviathan’ orientation has been said to represent a more polemic feature of Foucault’s 
earlier work (Dean, 1994: 157), and the Collège de France lectures in particular have been argued 
to constitute a ‘scaling up’ of micro-processes (Jessop, 2011: 60). Foucault’s interest here is how 
the shift from classical liberalism to neoliberalism involves ‘a state under the supervision of the 
market rather than a market supervised by the state’ (Foucault, 2008: 115). Contrary to neoliberal 
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state phobia, an ‘effective reduction of the state has been underway in the 2nd half of the 20th 
century, a reduction of both the growth of state control and of a “stratifying” and “stratified” gov-
ernmentality’ (Foucault, 2008: 191–192). Yet, although Foucault refrains from a value judgement, 
his analysis has been argued to remain within the boundaries of liberal economic discourse with-
out rendering them visible. In his preoccupation with divesting the centralized power of the state, 
he performs an ‘unwitting reiteration of the liberal imaginary of economy’ that fails to account for 
the ‘economic and monetary order of things’ (Tellmann, 2011: 286).
This may partly be explained by the fact that public credit not only ‘disappeared’ from the focus 
of cultural critical discourses, as alluded to earlier, but also did not feature prominently – or prob-
lematically – in modern economic theory. Conventional Keynesian, monetarist and classical theory 
modelled the main interaction between finance and the real economy as resulting from changes in 
the money supply, and not from the performance of markets for borrowing and lending (Gertler, 
1988: 559). Money, not credit, was the central financial aggregate in both Keynesian liquidity 
preference and Friedman’s quantity theory (Gertler, 1988: 563). If modern finance theory as such 
had difficulty becoming accepted as ‘economic’ (Bernstein, 1996), the adoption of the risk-free 
asset was never controversial.
Even if less so in Foucault’s account, fiscal policy and the public debt did play a role in the 
earlier ordoliberal–Keynesian debate, centring on the utility of government deficit spending versus 
austerity. Yet, although the austerity discourse following the 2010 sovereign debt crisis draws–
somewhat ‘intuitively’ – on a liberal discourse of fiscal rectitude going back to David Hume and 
Adam Smith (see Langley, 2015: 154; Blyth, 2013), the perception of sovereign safety is not neces-
sarily linked to austere fiscal policy. The great size of the US treasury market (i.e. the amount of 
outstanding debt), for example, also implies a high degree of liquidity. The vast increase in borrow-
ing by ‘advanced economies’ since the 2000s did not affect their sovereign credit rating until the 
global financial crisis. The tradeable indices developing with this increase that tracked the sover-
eign debt of comparable entities (such as the iTraxx SovX Western Europe) also weighted the share 
of debt by ‘issuance’ or ‘market capitalization’, meaning that the more debt a country had issued, 
the higher its representation in the index.21
Arguably, Foucault’s emphasis on divesture and discredit of the centralized power of the state 
runs somewhat counter to the very successful investiture and accreditation that sovereign credit 
implies. Akin to the tale of the emperor’s new clothes, this investiture hinges on the collective 
acceptance expressed in the voluntary purchase of government bonds. ‘Security is an investment’, 
Martin (2007: 17) has noted – a term that initially referred to the putting on of robes to assume 
spiritual powers. To be fair, sovereign credit is not precisely the Leviathan that Foucault rejects: its 
near-oxymoronic character is captured in the peculiar legal definition of sovereign creditworthi-
ness as ‘ability and willingness to pay’.22 It falls between the state and the market, or, perhaps, may 
be seen to be given to the state via the market. The ‘voluntary’ investment in and repayment of 
bonds is certainly also marked by dispositifs of credit and debt affecting the subject (see De Goede, 
2005; Jones, 2014). Sovereign safety is in important respects relational, defined between the ‘free’ 
flows of investors and captive demand for safety. Yet, although part of a complex relational appa-
ratus of power where sovereignty itself is reconfigurated (see Langley, 2015), it also refers to a 
centralized form of state power that is indeed ‘held’, ‘unified’ and ‘given’, and whose ‘mythicized 
abstraction’ (see Foucault, 2007: 109) is of great significance.
Translations of a tautology
If the dispositif fails to articulate this centralized aspect of sovereign safety and what might be 
termed the heterogeneous equivalence between public credit, the liquid bond, the risk-free asset 
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and the safe haven, this relation of power may more concisely be captured as a twofold translation: 
(1) a translation between the different individual terms that (2) itself rests on and reproduces a prior 
translation from public debt into public credit.
The concept of translation involves the conundrum that the ‘equivalence’, ‘adequacy’ or ‘fidel-
ity’ of a translation can never be vouched for, while the theoretical aspiration of equivalence can 
never be discarded (Langenohl, 2014: 94). In other words, translation fails perfect equivalence and 
yet creates equivalence by definition.23 The translation between the different registers of public 
credit, financial instrument and epistemic variable is shaped by both origin and context and ‘reveals 
new properties of the idea, object or action and discards others’ (Freeman, 2009: 432). It is here 
reminiscent of Stritzel’s (2011) analysis of political securitization as translation: that is, as a 
‘bounded’ or ‘constrained’ innovation, in which the idea, in Bakhtin’s words, does not ‘forget its 
own path and cannot completely free itself from the power of those concrete contexts into which it 
has entered’ (cited in Stritzel, 2011: 345). The framings in terms of bond-market dynamics or in 
terms of the financial model both maintain a certain continuity and are subject to certain condi-
tions: for example, in the translation of liquid government debt to the parameter of the risk-free 
asset, sovereign creditworthiness is conceived in relation to and in terms of the earlier model of the 
efficiency frontier of risky assets, deriving a new function in optimizing both the safety and the 
efficiency of portfolios while discarding the risk of inflation. Translation captures the heterogene-
ous equivalence between the different elements of sovereign safety because it not only lacks the 
principal aversion of the dispositif towards ‘unities’, but constitutes an act of unifying in itself (see 
Sakai, 2010).
A second translation present in all terms rests on a securitization in the financial sense – that is, 
a translation from debt into credit. This securitization critically hinges on how the translation from 
the ‘reality’ of debt into the ‘fiction’ of credit is itself secured. Historically, answers to this question 
have grounded public credit in a reference to ‘real’ value: although no longer requiring security 
from collateral or a high interest rate to offset the risk, the ‘discursive currency’ of reference was 
claimed to be guaranteed by both the gold standard and gold reserves (Goux, 1990: 103). The for-
mer was replaced first by the fixed exchange rate regime of Bretton Woods and later by the mon-
etarist maxim of central bank independence (Hall, 2008). Yet the claim to referentiality has equally 
been held to be illusory. As Marx ([1894 ] 1971: 466) notes in the third part of Capital, both shares 
and national bonds constitute a fictitious doubling of value: ‘A share of stock is merely a title of 
ownership to a corresponding portion of the surplus, that is a value to be realised by it’, and capital 
cannot exist twice, as both title/claim and actual capital invested. The same applies to national cur-
rency: ‘Just as everything in this credit system is doubled and trebled and transformed into a mere 
phantom of the imagination, so it is with the “reserve fund” where one would at least hope to grasp 
on something solid’ (Marx, [1894] 1971: 472).
With the illusory guarantee of the convertibility of circulating notes, public credit succumbs to 
either the magic or the scandal of ‘self-creation’ and is characterized by a certain circularity 
(Rotman, 1987: 49). As Brantlinger (1996: 48) puts it, ‘the modern nation-state may be the ultimate 
“guarantor of value,” but … [w]hat props it up – keeps it in power or, so to speak, in currency and 
circulation – is not gold and silver bullion locked up in its treasury vaults but merely public credit’. 
In the final analysis, public credit reveals itself as self-referential and tautological: just as the tau-
tology suggests difference through syntax that is semantically revealed as sameness, public credit 
is ultimately grounded in nothing but the appearance of referentiality. Even if not exactly the state 
that Foucault rejects, public credit is here reminiscent of the aporia of foundation that defines 
political authority: the ‘great tautology’ of the social contract theories constituting both mother and 
daughter of the nation, where the legitimating authority is symbolically externalized, concealing 
the self-authorizing character of the social contract (see Koschorke et al., 2007: 248; Derrida, 
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1994). Drawing on Hobbes’s analogy of authorship and authority, Vogl has similarly described the 
body politic as the ‘production [Inszenierung] of a Person that has subsequently always already 
been there’ and as the ‘institution of a reference that performs that which it signifies (“personality” 
out of the multitude)’. At the beginning of the Hobbesian primal scene stands a self-representing 
and self-withdrawing authorship that culminates in ‘the authorization of a fiction, that is, to be 
treated as if one had acted’ (Vogl, [2002] 2008: 24). Both public credit and political authority thus 
converge as effective fictions and as such are not purely reductive to the historical register, even if 
the means of securing the translation are. Once established, the legal ground of state theatre and the 
credit of sovereign safety precede the empirical world in elusive anteriority.
Conclusion: Financial and political security
Rather than returning the state as explanatory unit and axiom of international relations, this article 
has traced the contours and translations of an inconspicuous form of state power as public credit. 
As liquid bond, it is the most important form of collateral securing financial transactions. As the 
risk-free asset, sovereign safety occupies a central place in the derivation of the risk calculus 
underlying financial circulation. As safe haven, it constitutes a crucial factor for the oscillation of 
financial flows in and out of ‘safety’. The Foucault-inspired finance–security literature has so far 
discerned mechanisms of securing circulation too exclusively in technologies of risk, without real-
izing that the financial risk calculus carries at its heart that which, to some extent, may be seen as 
the very object of the Foucaultian divesture.24
Both as collateral and in the form of ‘sovereign risk’, sovereign credit is subject to probabilistic 
assessment and in that sense may be considered a ‘governmentalization of the state’. Yet govern-
mentality eludes an element of accreditation in which sovereign safety becomes ‘the “cement” that 
binds together all the members of the body politic’ (Coleridge) and the ‘soul of the state’ (Dickens) 
(cited in Brantlinger, 1996: 132). Although the safety of sovereign credit is relative, contingent and 
relational, the power of credit unifies an effective fiction that is not purely sustained by and reduc-
ible to the specificities and multiplicities that Foucault (2004: 46) regards as the ‘real fabric of both 
power relations and the great apparatuses of power’. If, as Martin (2007: 19) notes, ‘securitisation 
assembles credit, derivatives disperse risk’, sovereign safety makes the latter possible through the 
former. And while sovereign safety is no longer referred to as ‘public credit’, its accreditation is 
present in the ‘boring’ nature of fixed debt that bonds until recently displayed.
I will conclude by pointing to three resonances of political and financial security that this analy-
sis has made it possible to discern. First, the original financial meaning of securitization as the 
becoming liquid, becoming plausible, becoming credible of securities may have more in common 
with the Copenhagen School’s definition of securitization as speech act (Wæver, 1995) or transla-
tion (Stritzel, 2011) than has so far been noticed. Second, political and financial security share an 
ambivalence of meaning as means to secure a value and as norm/value itself: just as all early for-
mulations of financial security vary between signifying the means to secure a contract and the 
contract itself, security in a political sense has alternatively referred to the means of securing a 
particular value (such as safe passage, the state, society, the human, population, life) and a condi-
tion or value of being secure. This normative understanding of security as a positive and desirable 
condition in itself in fact only emerged in the 20th century in the course of the interwar retrospec-
tive valuation of a ‘lost’ security (Kaufmann, 2003). As such, it sparked the paradigm of national 
security of the emerging discipline of international relations (Wæver, 1997). These transitive and 
intransitive meanings25 of security also overlap, for example in the protection of credit: the daily 
calculation of LIBOR, the rate at which banks would lend to each other, is secured by back-up 
offices that ensure its operation in the case of terrorist attacks and other incidents (MacKenzie, 
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2008: 237). Similarly, Dodd describes digital gold currency as hybrid: ‘Though it represents gold, 
its security is protected by code, i.e., digital cryptography’ (Dodd, 2014: 42, emphasis in original). 
Finally, despite an apparent contrast in political and financial settings, the value of security in lib-
eral governance is interdependent with risk. At first glance, security appears to be valued differ-
ently in these two contexts. While protection from danger has a strongly positive connotation, 
security in finance shares this sense only in ‘bad’ times. In ‘good’ times, security is associated with 
low yields and the cost of a counterfactual ‘safety premium’ paid in the form of foregone interest 
that could have been earned by investing in a more profitable and risky asset class. In this vein, 
Buzan’s (1983) account of security in the context of the market had defined it in zero-sum relation 
to efficiency and freedom. Later critical analyses raised this ‘sectoral’ condition to the encompass-
ing characteristic of liberal governance, founding the legitimacy of the state in the service of a 
higher order of economic insecurity (Cooper, 2004). The liberal security dispositif thus has been 
said to promote a circular logic of producing incessant insecurity against which to hedge (De 
Goede, 2010; Martin, 2007). The production and valuation of security here bear some resemblance 
to the emphasis of critical security studies on one same process of (in)securitization (see Dillon, 
1996; Balzacq et al., 2010). In the liberal dispositif of securing circulation, financial and political 
security increasingly converge in a common framework of crisis governance, marked by both the 
financialization of security and the securitization of finance. And yet, security as credit is not to 
be revealed as delusion before a deeper truth of insecurity: securitization as accreditation may be 
fictitious, but it is not false.
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Notes
 1. Conze (1984: 832) briefly alludes to the Roman ‘civil law technical terminus’ of securitas as a debt secu-
rity similar to cautio, but although he notes that this sense is still alive he does not consider it relevant for 
the conceptual history of security.
 2. Der Derian (1995: 28) refers to the sense of ‘pledge, bond, surety, sought in the face of danger or debt’ 
as mediating between two other historic meanings of security as ‘condition of being protected, free from 
danger, safety’ and ‘false or misplaced confidence’.
 3. The specific kind of security was specified as fiducia, hypotheca or pignus, implying different con-
ditions for the transfer of security: ‘Fiducia indicated the transfer of ownership to the creditor, who 
generally but not always retained possession as well; pignus indicated the retention of ownership by 
the debtor, but the transfer of possession to the creditor; and hypotheca indicated the retention of both 
ownership and possession by the debtor but with the creation of a possessory interest in the creditor’ 
(Goebel, 1961–62: 29). The notions of mortgage, chattel and pledge continue these different variations 
of security (see Slovenko, 1958).
 4. See ‘collateral’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
 5. A different mechanism for securing the circulation of maritime trade emerged from the 13th cen-
tury with the development of insurance fostered by the ‘probabilistic revolution’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 
2011: 16).
 6. See ‘security’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
 7. See ‘securities’ in the Penguin Dictionary of Commerce (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
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 8. In the 15th century, Italian banks charged Charles VIII of France an interest rate of 100% on war 
loans while charging Italian merchants 5–10%. The Bank of England’s first loan to the British gov-
ernment carried an interest rate of 8% – double the rate at which it discounted trade bills. See Haldane 
(2009: 1).
 9. Although the term today still occasionally appears in legal documents, it is rarely used in this sense 
and now generally refers to a different meaning, such as the system of public banks or the operation of 
‘services of general economic interest in the banking sector’. See European Commission (1997).
10. Maritime insurance both served as instrument in military strategy and fuelled the national debt as 
merchants and underwriters invested their profits in the ‘funds’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2012: 23).
11. For a more detailed account, see Boy (2014). For an erudite account of the complex interrelation between 
public credit, economic theory and literature, see Brantlinger (1996).
12. See ‘liquidity’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
13. The most active trader in Royal Africa Company stock (John Bull) traded 13 times from 1672 to 1679 
(Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999: 370).
14. From 11,000 in 1709, the number of creditors rose to 25,000 in 1737 and 60,000 in 1756 (Muldrew, 
1998: 116).
15. See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/ (accessed 13 June 2013).
16. An option is a contract that gives the right, but not the obligation, to buy (or sell) a set quantity of assets 
at a set price in the future.
17. These requirements – along with the bail-out and stimulus programmes of the financial crisis – are partly 
responsible for the phenomenal increase of the global bond market in the new millennium, which tripled 
in size from $11 trillion in 2001 to more than $31 trillion in 2011 (Economist, 2012a).
18. This resonates to some degree with Bauman’s (2000: 135–136) argument that ‘safe ports for trust are few 
and far between, and most of the time trust floats unanchored vainly seeking storm-protected havens’, 
yet his juxtaposition of the liquefying power of capital and trust remains problematic.
19. Andrew Haldane, then Director of Financial Stability of the Bank of England, giving testimony to the 
Treasury Select Committee on 2 June 2013.
20. Economist Robert Shiller in an interview with Money in December 2014. See Regnier (2015).
21. This logic derives from the capital asset pricing model, which suggests that the market portfolio – the 
capitalization-weighted portfolio of all assets – should have the highest return per unit of risk (Goldsticker 
and Lowell, 2012: 4).
22. As opposed to the definition of private creditworthiness as ‘ability to pay’. The phenomenon of voluntary 
sovereign repayment has puzzled economic theory: Why would a sovereign debtor repay if he cannot be 
coerced to do so? See Kolb, 2011: 4.
23. As Sakai (2010) has pointed out, the historical practice of translation itself significantly contributed to 
the essentialization of different cultures and was pivotal in establishing nation-states as different but 
equivalent imaginary entities.
24. This applies to the major models of finance theory such as the capital asset pricing model and the Black–
Scholes option theory, but not to value-at-risk.
25. I owe this terminology to Andreas Langenohl.
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